This study examines analyst information intermediary roles using a textual analysis of analyst reports and corporate disclosures. We employ a topic modeling methodology from computational linguistic research to compare the thematic content of a large sample of analyst reports issued promptly after earnings conference calls with the content of the calls themselves. We show that analysts discuss exclusive topics beyond those from conference calls and interpret topics from conference calls. In addition, we find that investors place a greater value on new information in analyst reports when managers face greater incentives to withhold value-relevant information. Analyst interpretation is particularly valuable when the processing costs of conference call information increase. Finally, we document that investors react to analyst report content that simply repeats managers' discussion. Overall, our study shows that analysts play the information intermediary roles by discovering information beyond corporate disclosures and by clarifying and confirming corporate disclosures.
Introduction
Financial analysts play an important information intermediary role in capital markets. A vast body of literature is devoted to understanding their value (e.g., Ramnath et al. 2008; Bradshaw 2011; Beyer et al. 2010 ). It is not until recent years, however, that researchers have started to pay attention to the phenomenon that analysts issue the majority of their research reports immediately following important corporate disclosure events. For example, Li et al. (2015) show that 61% of analyst recommendation revisions are issued within three days of corporate events; Livnat and Zhang (2012) find that 74% of analyst forecast revisions promptly follow corporate events; Altınkılıç and Hansen (2009) claim that almost 80% of recommendation revisions are in response to corporate events. Although a large proportion of analyst reports are issued immediately after corporate disclosure events, surprisingly little is known about analyst information roles in these narrow windows and, in particular, about the interplay between the information in their research reports and the closely preceding corporate disclosures.
Several papers call into question the value of analyst information beyond the closely preceding corporate disclosures. Altınkılıç and Hansen (2009) , Altınkılıç et al. (2013) , and Loh and Stulz (2011) suggest that analyst reports are "information free" and that they merely "piggyback" on the information in corporate disclosure events to improve their perceived performance. Yezegel (2015) , Li et al. (2015) , and Bradley et al. (2014) reach the opposite conclusion that analysts provide incremental information beyond the closely preceding corporate disclosures. All of the aforementioned studies, however, focus on either analyst earnings forecasts or stock recommendations and ignore the fact that analysts also issue a textual report at the same time, the content of which could be related to the information contained in the preceding corporate disclosure.
Setting aside the conflicting evidence in the aforementioned studies, focusing on earnings forecasts and stock recommendations may fail to provide a complete understanding of analyst information roles immediately after corporate disclosures for several reasons. First, investors do not consider earnings forecasts to be an important research output from analysts because their information content is restricted to short-term earnings (see Institutional Investor's annual survey of "What Investors Really Want" from 1998 Want" from -2015 Bradshaw 2011; Huang et al. 2014) . Investors may also not take stock recommendations at face value due to their discrete nature and the well-documented optimistic bias (Bradshaw 2011) . Second, one cannot glimpse from earnings forecasts and stock recommendations what information has entered into an analyst's conclusion. Not considering the supporting arguments or the input variables underlying the summary research outputs would understate analysts' value and may bias researchers towards concluding "piggybacking." Finally, because of the close proximity of corporate disclosures and analyst research reports, the key to understanding analysts' value is to reveal the interplay between these two sets of information. It is still unclear, for example, whether analysts supply investors with new information when managers withhold information in corporate disclosures or whether analysts clarify corporate disclosures when these disclosures are costly to process. Given that both analyst reports and corporate disclosures contain a large amount of qualitative information, focusing on only the quantitative outputs fails to capture the rich texture of the interplay between them.
Our study fills the gap in the literature by providing an in-depth analysis of the information embedded in the textual content of analyst research reports relative to the information embedded in the textual content of the closely preceding corporate disclosures. 1 Specifically, we focus on a large sample of analyst reports issued on the same day of and the day following quarterly earnings conference calls (hereafter, prompt reports) to investigate the following questions: (1) What type of information do analysts provide in reports issued immediately following earnings conference calls? (2) Do analysts' discussions in their reports of new topics and of conference call topics provide incremental value to investors? And (3) Under what conditions do analyst reports provide more value to investors?
Quarterly earnings announcements and their related conference calls are arguably the most important corporate disclosures. Their importance is reinforced by the overwhelming number of sell-side analyst research reports issued immediately following these events. Indeed, we find that 46.5% of analyst revision reports are issued either on the day of or the day following earnings conference calls. Analysts cluster their reports in this narrow window, because only timely reaction to the conference calls can offer their clients an informational advantage in trading. 2 Because of their close proximity, the value of prompt reports can be assessed only in conjunction with the content of the calls. An intuitive way to assess "what analysts say" immediately after the calls is to partition the discussion in their reports into a discussion of topics already covered in the calls and a discussion of new topics. The former likely provides an interpretation of the information already contained in the calls; the latter likely provides information beyond what managers had released publicly. Following the literature (e.g., Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Chen et al. 2010) , we term these the analyst information interpretation role and the analyst information discovery role, respectively. In this study, we investigate the value that each information role provides to investors and its relation with corporate disclosures. In doing so, our paper heeds the call from a number of review studies, including Ramnath et al. (2008) , Bradshaw (2011) and Beyer et al. (2010) , for such insight.
Several sources of potential value can arise from the analyst information discovery role: Analysts conduct their own private research and channel checks, for example, by visiting stores and warehouses, investigating supply chains, and surveying customers; 3 they have private interactions with not only CEOs and CFOs, but also division-level managers from operating regions and product lines (Soltes 2014) ; they package information collected from multiples sources, such as other information intermediaries, peer firms in the industry, independent research agencies, and government agencies, and undertake original analysis by "connecting the dots"; and they generate new information signals, such as firms' valuations, earnings forecasts, and long-term growth rates using their high level of financial expertise. In our setting, discovery 2 An All-Star analyst from a large brokerage house we interviewed commented to us that "the market is efficient but impatient. Analysts need to feed the market with prompt reaction to management's thinking and outlook guidance. In addition, competition forces everyone to issue reports quickly, otherwise their reports may not be read by clients." 3 For example, in a Morgan Stanley report issued on August 12, 2011, immediately after J.C. Penney's conference call, an analyst alludes to a consumer survey: "The top reason consumers say they shop JCP is due to 'low prices, great discounts' (as per our most recent consumer survey)." reflects analysts' private efforts to generate new topics that are otherwise not readily available, but the sources of the information can include a variety of public and private channels.
We consider analysts as serving an information interpretation role when they discuss topics that have already been discussed in the conference call. Similar to the media's providing value through information dissemination or rebroadcasting, as shown by recent research (e.g., Miller 2006; Bushee et al. 2010; Drake et al. 2014) , analysts might be able to provide value by discussing these conference call topics.
First, by interpreting only the relevant topics from the calls, analysts attract and direct investors' limited attention to what they view as the important parts of the call. 4 Second, analysts can clarify managers' disclosure by using their own language, offering their opinions on issues raised by managers, and quantitatively assessing management's subjective statements. Third, perceived as independent agents, analysts can enhance the reliability of statements from managers, who may suffer from agency problems.
Taken together, we posit that the analyst information interpretation role helps investors understand corporate disclosures better by lowering processing costs and enhancing information quality. Whether and when investors consider these information roles as being useful are empirical questions that our study attempts to address. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) , Chen et al. (2010) , and Livnat and Zhang (2012) , among others, point out the importance of understanding the relation between analyst information and corporate disclosures.
Our study differs from these studies, which also examine the analyst information discovery and interpretation roles, in the following ways. First, these studies infer analyst information roles from the timing of the analyst revisions relative to corporate disclosures. That is, they assume that analyst revisions following (preceding) public announcements reflect the information interpretation (discovery) role. We argue that analysts engage in both information roles in prompt reports and develop a novel and direct measure of these information roles based on a textual comparison of analyst reports and corporate disclosures. Second, we provide new insights to the literature by identifying the economic conditions under which the analyst information discovery and interpretation roles provide greater value to investors.
These economic conditions relate to the features of earnings conference calls, including managers' tendency to withhold information during the calls and the processing costs of the calls' information.
Therefore, our investigation provides more texture to the interplay between analyst research and closely preceding corporate disclosures.
Our empirical measures of the analyst information roles are based on a large-scale comparison of the thematic content of prompt analyst reports (denoted as ) to that of manager narratives in the earnings conference calls (denoted as ). 5 Specifically, we employ a topic modeling approach called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to construct novel measures of the economically meaningful topics discussed in analyst reports and conference calls. Developed by Blei et al. (2003) , LDA is an advanced textual analysis technique grounded in computational linguistics research that calculates the statistical correlations among words in a large set of documents to identify and quantify the underlying topics in these documents. LDA can be thought of as a dimensionality-reduction technique, similar to cluster analysis or principal component analysis, but designed specifically for text. We conduct a battery of validity tests to verify the effectiveness of LDA in identifying economically interpretable topics within analyst reports and conference call transcripts.
We base our analysis on a sample of 17,750 conference call transcripts and 159,210 prompt analyst reports. When we compare the thematic content of and , we find that analysts spend an average of 31% of their discussion on exclusive topics that receive little or no mention by managers, and thus 69% of their discussion focuses on conference topics. This suggests that both analyst information discovery and interpretation roles are substantial.
Next, we find that investor reactions to both information roles are economically significant and incremental to their reaction to the conference call information and earnings news. To understand the sources of analyst value, we predict and find that investor reaction to the analyst information discovery 5 Conference call narratives include manager discussions in both the presentation and the question and answer (Q&A) parts of the conference call. Analyses based on only the presentation part of the conference calls yield similar results.
role is more pronounced when managers face greater incentives to withhold value-relevant information (i.e., when firms have greater proprietary cost, face higher litigation risk, or experience bad performance);
and that investor reaction to the analyst interpretation role is greater when the conference call information has higher processing costs (i.e., when the call contains a greater amount of uncertain or qualitative statements, or does not deliver bad news).
To shed further light on the interplay between analyst reports and corporate disclosure, we show that analysts respond to investor demand and exert more effort to serve in either information role depending on the features of the corporate disclosures. Specifically, analysts increase the amount of information discovery when managers are more likely to withhold information, and they use a greater amount of their own language to clarify management disclosures (as opposed to merely repeating managers' words) when the cost of processing management disclosure is higher. Additional analysis shows that investors value analysts' efforts. That is, the value of each information role increases with the length of the discussion; the interpretation's value increases further when analysts use their own language to discuss conference call topics.
Finally, we demonstrate that analysts sometimes engage in confirming what managers say in the conference calls. Within the 69% of the discussion in prompt reports that is devoted to interpreting conference call topics, 23% does not entail a different vocabulary from that used by managers. Although such confirming discussions are unlikely to contain new insights or provide greater clarity than managers' original discussion, we find that the investor reaction to it is significant, albeit having considerably smaller economic magnitude than that of analysts' discovery or interpretation using analysts' own language. This evidence suggests that even when analysts selectively repeat management disclosures, they provide confirming value by identifying and disseminating the useful conference call topics to their clients (i.e., confirming these topics' importance and relevance) and by enhancing the credibility of managers' statements (i.e., confirming these topics' validity).
Our study provides several contributions to the literature. First, we provide new insight into analyst information intermediary roles immediately after corporate disclosure events and extend our understanding on the interplay between analyst research and corporate disclosures. In particular, we show that the value of analyst information discovery and interpretation roles depends on the features of the corporate disclosures. Second, our study introduces a textual measurement of information content to the literature, which is based on comparing the discussions of economically meaningful topics in analyst reports and management disclosures. Finally, our study contributes to the emerging area of textual analysis in the accounting and finance literature (see a recent review by Loughran and McDonald 2016) .
Much of this research focuses on the textual characteristics (e.g., readability and tone) of corporate financial disclosures (e.g., Management Discussion and Analysis in 10-K, and S-1). Our topic modeling methodology provides another avenue through which researchers can expand their analyses of the textual content of corporate financial disclosures from "how texts are being said" to "what is being said" in these disclosures.
Topic modeling and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
We obtain our empirical measures of analyst information intermediary roles by comparing the textual narratives in to those in at the topic level. To identify topics, we use LDA, which is developed by Blei et al. (2003) and has become a widely used topic modeling algorithm. LDA uses a statistical generative model to imitate the process of how a human writes a document. Specifically, LDA assumes that each word in a document is generated in two steps. First, assuming that each document has its own topic distribution, a topic is randomly drawn based on the document's topic distribution. Next, assuming that each topic has its own word distribution, a word is randomly drawn from the word distribution of the topic selected in the previous step. Repeating these two steps word by word generates a document. The LDA algorithm discovers the topic distribution for each document and the word distribution of each topic iteratively, by fitting this two-step generative model to the observed words in the documents until it finds the best set of variables that describe the topic and word distributions.
Essentially, LDA reduces the extraordinary dimensionality of linguistic data from words to topics, based on word co-occurrences in the same document, similar to cluster analysis or principal component analysis applied to quantitative data. Internet Appendix I provides a detailed discussion of the intuition and technical features of LDA.
LDA offers several advantages over manual coding. First, it is capable of processing a massive collection of documents that would be too costly to code manually. Second, LDA provides a reliable and replicable classification of topics. Neither of these features can be attained with manual coding, which relies on human coders' subjective judgment. Third, LDA does not require researchers to pre-specify rules or keywords for the underlying taxonomy of categories. Topics and their probabilistic relations with keywords are discovered by LDA from fitting the assumed statistical model to an entire textual corpus. In contrast, manual coding or dictionary methods require researchers to pre-specify a deterministic set of rules or keywords to categorize topics. It is close to impossible to determine a priori the topics across all documents, the keywords that identify each topic for an entire textual corpus, or the probabilistic relation between keywords and topics.
To allow the LDA algorithm to fully identify the topic structure, we use all available earnings conference calls (18,607 transcripts obtained from Thomson Reuter's StreetEvents Database) and analyst reports (476,633 analyst reports obtained from Thomson Reuter's Investext Database) for S&P 500 firms during the 2003-2012 period. 6 As described in detail in Appendix I, prior to applying the LDA algorithm, we conduct several preprocessing steps to clean and parse the textual data. We conduct the LDA analysis for each industry separately, because many topics are industry-specific. The total number of topics for each industry is set at 60 based on the analysis of the Perplexity Score (discussed in Appendix I). The LDA outputs clusters of words in each topic, as well as the words' probabilistic relation with each topic.
In mathematical form, it comprises a matrix of word probabilities in each topic. Using this matrix, we assign each sentence in our documents to the most likely topic, by summing up the probabilities of its words in each topic and assigning the sentence to the topic with the highest probability.
Validation of LDA outputs
We provide several validation tests for the LDA topic outputs. First, following the procedure in Quinn et al. (2010) , Atkins et al. (2012) , and Bao and Datta (2012) , we manually read the high-probability words in key topics and their respective sentences, to provide a short and intuitive label for each topic.
These labels are intended to validate that LDA is able to discern the underlying economic content of the topics Overall, the results in Table 1 validate the effectiveness of the LDA algorithm in identifying distinct, economically meaningful topics in conference calls and analyst reports. For example, the frequent appearance of semantically related words "multiple," "target-price," "valuation," "EPS," and "price-toearnings" in a topic in the Capital Goods industry suggests that this topic is related to "valuation model."
Similarly, the frequent appearance of the words "drug," "trial," "announce," "clinical," and "phase," in a topic in the Health Care Equipment & Services industry suggests that this topic relates to drug trials. We also find that LDA effectively uncovers general topics related to a firm's financial performance, as well as industry-specific topics, such as offshore drilling in the energy industry, enterprise software and IT services in the software industry, and steel production in the materials industry (see Internet Appendix Table IA1 ). Finally, our results verify that the LDA algorithm recognizes the polysemy or contextual nature of words by assigning the same word to multiple topics. The word "price," for example, is related to both "valuation" and "raw materials and input price" in the Capital Goods industry, reflecting the contextual nature of the word.
In our second validation test, we compare the temporal variation in the amount of discussion dedicated to key topics with important industry and economy-wide events. 9 Specifically, Figure 1 depicts the proportion of key topics in earnings conference calls and analyst reports for the banking and telecommunication industries from 2003 to 2012 and the performance of their respective sector indices (Financial Sector SPDR -XLF and iShares US Telecommunications -IYZ, respectively). We select these two industries based on the turmoil in the banking industry and the technology evolution in the telecommunication industry during our sample period.
[Insert Figure 1 Figure 1 depicts the relation between technological developments and topic discussions for the telecommunications industry. Here, we see that landline-related topic discussions (e.g., DSL technology) decrease during our sample period, while topics labeled as "Smartphone Business" and "Wireless Subscribers" increase.
In the third validation, we compare the LDA's topic assignment to that of a human coder for a small sample of conference calls and the associated prompt analyst reports from Food, Beverage, and Tobacco industry. We first randomly select a conference call from each of the three companies in this industry (i.e., Campbell Soup, Coca-Cola, and Altria Group) and obtain the conference call transcripts and associated prompt analyst reports. Next, we invited an expert, who is an Institutional Investor All-Star analyst covering this industry, to label the intuition of the LDA-generated topics based on their keywords. 10 Lastly, we provided the topic intuition generated by the All-Star analyst to a human coder (a graduate student in an accounting master degree program) and asked him to label the topics of each sentence in the call transcripts and analyst reports. 11 The LDA topic assignment is consistent with manual assignment in 69%, 66%, and 60% of the sentences for Campbell Soup, Coca-Cola, and Altria Group, respectively. These consistency rates are much higher than 5%, which is the consistency rate between a random assignment of topics and manual coding. 12
Taken together, we interpret the evidence from the validation tests as supporting the effectiveness of LDA to identify and quantify economically meaningful topics in earnings conference calls and analyst reports.
Sample selection and descriptive statistics
The sample involved in the regression analyses is comprised of quarterly earnings conference call transcripts and analyst reports issued on the day of or the day following these conference calls for S&P 500 firms from 2003 to 2012. 13 Table 2 describes our sample selection criteria. As shown in Panel A, we start from 18,607 earnings conference call transcripts available in the StreetEvents database. To verify that these are earnings conference calls, we match them with earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S. This matching reduces our sample to 18,236 conference calls that occurred during days [0, +1] relative to the I/B/E/S earnings announcement dates. Next, we require each conference call to be accompanied by at least one analyst report, which yields a final sample of 17,750 earnings conference calls with matched 10 The analyst considered the LDA topics "quite comprehensive and meaningful" and pointed out that "the key challenge (of topic classification) is a wide coverage of the topics and a flexibility of topics used in different situations." 11 The coder was given only the intuition of the 60 topics but not the keywords from the LDA outputs to avoid mimicking the LDA results. We asked the coder to assign each sentence to up to three topics due to the challenging nature of manual coding. 12 If LDA randomly assigns one of the 60 topics to each sentence, the probability that this topic happens to be one of the three topics selected by the human coder is 3/60 = 5%. 13 Our sample firms constitute, on average, about 72% of the total U.S. market capitalization, or 77% of the total U.S. firms covered by analysts. We acknowledge that our findings based on S&P 500 firms might not directly apply to smaller firms that receive less analyst coverage.
analyst reports. 14 [Insert Table 2 
here]
As reported in Panel B of Table 2 , the initial sample of analyst reports includes all reports issued for S&P 500 firms during the 2003-2012 period (476,633 reports) that we use to perform our LDA analysis.
We then exclude reports not issued on the day of or the day following an earnings conference call. We also exclude reports issued on the day of a call but prior to its start time. Our final sample is comprised of 159,210 analyst reports. Prompt analyst reports constitute 33% of the entire population of analyst reports (or 47% if we only consider revision reports), an overwhelming percentage considering that they are concentrated in only eight days of a year. These statistics reinforce the importance of understanding the analyst information intermediary roles immediately following corporate disclosure events.
Over the entire sample period, an average of nine analyst reports are issued in the two-day window after the calls. Since our focus is on the information role of analysts in aggregate, we combine all analyst reports issued during this two-day window and denote it as . To examine the difference between the respective topic proportions in the analyst and manager narratives, we conduct a Pearson's chi-square test for the homogeneity of the distribution of topics discussed in each and pair (see Internet Appendix Table IA2 ). 15 The homogeneity between the topic distributions in these documents is rejected at the 10% level for 91% of conference calls. That is, in 91% of the pairs, managers and analysts devote different proportions of narratives to each topic. In contrast, the topic distributions of analyst questions ( ) and manager answers ( ) in the Q&A session are significantly different at the 10% level for only 0.17% of the conference calls. This finding is consistent with intuition and provides further validation for LDA topic measures. Finally, to reduce noise, we include in the empirical analyses topics if 14 Thomson Reuters Streetevent Database provides tickers of firms hosting the conference calls. We manually match the conference calls to Compustat's S&P 500 list using these tickers. For analyst reports, we extract firms' tickers from analyst reports and match the reports to Compustat's S&P 500 list using tickers. 15 The topic distribution of a document can be expressed as a topic vector, in which element is the percentage of the sentences dedicated to the discussion of topic . Pearson's chi-square test tests the null that the topic vector of equals the topic vector of .
their length exceeds 2% of the document's entire length. 16 On average, ( ) in our sample contain 14
(12) such topics; furthermore, the combined length of these topics accounts for over 80% (85%) of the entire discussion in the ( ).
Empirical measures, tests and results
The evidence in Section 3 suggests that topic distributions in and are different. Based on this evidence, we operationalize the analyst information discovery role as cases when analysts discuss topics that receive little or no mention by managers during the and their information interpretation role as cases when they discuss topics in their prompt reports. Internet Appendix II provides two illustrative examples for each role using excerpts from conference call transcripts and analyst reports. In our sample, analysts spend an average of 31% (69%) of their discussion on discovery (interpretation). The value of analysts' discovery and interpretation roles, however, depends on whether analyst efforts, combined with their high level of financial expertise and in-depth knowledge of the firm and industry, result in valuable information beyond the conference calls. We use the following empirical analyses to investigate whether and under what circumstances analyst information discovery and interpretation provide value to investors.
Do investors value analyst information discovery and interpretation roles?
We assess the value analyst information discovery and interpretation provided to investors by estimating the following regression:
where the market reaction, 0,1 , is the cumulative market-adjusted return during [0, 1] relative to the earnings announcement dates. 17 Because the market return is directional, we follow Huang et al. (2014) and Davis et al. (2015) and use the tone of the narratives (i.e., the percentage of positive sentences less the Standard errors are estimated with a two-way cluster at the firm and year levels.
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 
here]
The summary statistics reported in Table 3 show that both mean values of _ and _ are positive (0.188 and 0.217, respectively), consistent with the overall analyst optimism documented in the literature. The average tone of earnings conference calls is 0.276, which is significantly more positive than analysts' tone, suggesting that managers in general are more optimistic than analysts.
The results of estimating Eq. (1) are reported in Table 4 . We find positive and significant (at the 0.01 level) coefficients on both _ and _ , after controlling for managers' disclosure, earnings surprises, and other variables that can explain market reactions, consistent with both roles providing incremental value to the market. A one standard deviation increase in _ 18 We follow the procedures described in Huang et al. (2014) to classify each sentence as positive, negative, or neutral with the naïve Bayes algorithm. 19 In a sensitivity test reported in Internet Appendix Table IA3 , we also include other research outputs contained in the analyst reports as control variables, including the revisions of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and target prices. The estimated coefficients on _ and _ remain significant and positive.
increases the two-day market adjusted return by 1.09%; a one standard deviation increase in _ increases it by 0.65%, indicating that both roles trigger economically significant market reactions. F-tests show that the coefficient on _ is significantly greater than that of _ . Overall, results in Table 4 suggest that investors value both analyst information discovery and interpretation roles and place a greater weight on their interpretation role immediately after earnings conference calls. 20
Under what conditions do investors value analyst information discovery and interpretation more?
To understand the economic determinants of the value of analyst information discovery and interpretation, we estimate the following regression:
(2)
In Eq. (2), coefficient estimates on the interaction terms demonstrate whether discovery or interpretation triggers additional market reaction under various economic conditions. We conjecture that investors would place a greater value on the analyst information discovery role when managers withhold value-relevant information from investors. Prior literature on voluntary disclosure identifies several situations in which managers are more likely to withhold information, including firms with high proprietary costs, high litigation risk, and bad news, all of which we examine in Eq.
(2). For the analyst information interpretation role, we posit that investors would place a greater value on this role when the processing cost of conference call information is higher. Next, we discuss our measures of proprietary cost, litigation risk, bad news, and processing cost. 20 To examine whether market reaction to analyst information roles depends on the consistency in _ and _ , we include in regression model (1) Table IA4 , show significant (at the 0.01 level) and negative coefficients on _ * _ _ , consistent with the intuition that analysts' discovery becomes more useful when its tone is more consistent with the tone of analyst interpretation.
Proprietary cost
Managers may choose to withhold proprietary information if disclosing it hurts firms' competitive advantage. Numerous studies on the proprietary cost of disclosure find that such costs represent a significant consequence that prevents managers from being forthcoming (see reviews in Verrecchia 2001; Dye 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001) . Managers, for example, may withhold information on research and development related to an innovative product or a new drug. In this case, analysts may exert more efforts in private research, such as communicating with the company's employees, researching the company's patent filing, investigating the company's suppliers, and attending company-hosted or industry conferences to collect value-relevant information that they can provide to investors. We follow Li et al. (2013) and measure the proprietary cost of disclosure (denoted as ) as the percentage of competition references (i.e., occurrence of words related to competition) in the firm's previous conference call. 21 Li et al. (2013) argue that this measure reflects managers' perceptions of competition and thus does not rely on industry boundaries or comprehensive identification of all sources of competition (e.g., competition from private firms, foreign firms, and potential new entrants).
Litigation risk
Another factor that previous research identifies as affecting disclosure is the litigation risk faced by a firm (Healy and Palepu 2001; Johnson et al. 2001 ). Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009) , for example, find that, despite the protection of the Safe Harbor provision of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, firms that have been subjects of disclosure-related shareholder lawsuits are more wary about providing information to investors. Consistent with the results in these studies, Hollander et al. (2010) find that managers are less likely to answer participant questions during earnings conference calls when 21 Following Li et al. (2013) , we consider a number of competition references: "competition," "competitor," "competitive," "compete," and "competing." We include words with an "s" appended and remove phrases that contain negation, such as "less competitive," and "few competitors." We also scale the number of counts by the total number of words in the document. Although Li et al. (2013) construct their measure using the MD&A section of 10-K filings, we capture managers' perceptions of competition from . We examine 100 randomly selected competition references from our sample and find that they highly resemble the examples provided in Appendix A of Li et al. (2013) . We use the competition measure based on the firm's previous earnings conference call to mitigate endogeneity concern. litigation risk is high. We follow Hollander et al. (2010) and Field et al. (2005) and measure litigation risk using the standard deviation of monthly returns over the one year prior to the conference call (denoted as ).
Bad news
Theoretical models generally predict that disclosure increases with firm performance (e.g., Dye 1986; Verrecchia 1983) . When a manager has bad news to deliver, he may choose to withhold relevant information, such as the true explanations for the bad performance, because such information may decrease his human capital and reputation (Verrecchia 2001) . Empirical studies generally support this theory (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Miller 2002; Chen et al. 2011) . It is also possible that when there is bad news, managers are forced to focus on past performance and cannot disclose other relevant information. This is suggested in the survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) that "if the company fails to meet the guided number…the focus shifts to talking about why the company was unable to meet the consensus estimate" as opposed to talking about the firm's future prospects. For these reasons, we expect investors to place a greater value on the analyst information discovery role when firms deliver bad news during their conference calls. We measure firm news using two variables: an indicator variable of whether a firm's earnings have missed the analyst consensus forecast (denoted as ) and the earnings surprise (denoted as _ ).
Processing cost
Previous research shows that earnings conference calls may entail high information processing costs if managers' statements are unstructured, ambiguous, subjective, or qualitative (Frankel et al. 1999; Brochet et al. 2016) . Prior research also documents that the demand for analyst research increases when investors' understanding of corporate disclosures requires high processing costs (Lehavy et al. 2011) .
Accordingly, we expect that investors find the analyst information interpretation role more valuable when the information disclosed during the conference call is more difficult to process.
We use five measures to evaluate the processing cost of conference call information. The first two are based on the notion that ambiguous language imposes higher processing costs (Epstein and Schneider 2008) . Ambiguous language normally contains uncertain words and qualitative and subjective statements.
We follow Loughran and McDonald (2013) and measure the percentage of uncertain words contained in a (denoted as ). 22 Specifically, when managers use words such as "may," "assume," "possibly," and "approximately," it is more difficult for investors to judge the quality of the information.
Consistent with this argument, Loughran and McDonald find that having a greater number of uncertain words in Form S-1 filings increases the volatility in the valuation of the IPO. Compared to quantitative information, qualitative and subjective language is harder to process because of the lack of precision, reliability, and objective benchmarks (Huang et al. 2014) . We follow Huang et al. (2014) and measure the extent to which qualitative vocabulary is used to discuss firm performance in the (denoted as ) as one minus the percentage of sentences that contain "$" or "%." The third measure is based on the intuition that the complexity of the disclosure might increase with the complexity of firms' operations. Following Frankel et al. (2006) , we measure the complexity of firm operations using the number of firm segments (# ). The last two measures concern firm performance. Hutton et al. (2003) , among others, argue that investors are naturally skeptical about good news from managers, because managers benefit from good news but have no incentives to exaggerate bad news. Hutton et al. (2003) show that bad news from managers is always informative regardless of the inclusion of supplementary statements, but good news from managers is informative only when accompanied by supplementary statements. Their finding suggests that compared to the situation of bad news, investors rely more on analysts' interpretation of good news from managers, because the information is more ambiguous and less credible. We use and _ to measure firm performance.
Analyst characteristics
We consider whether analyst forecast experience ( ) and their All-Star status ( ) influence the value of their information discovery and interpretation roles. is the average forecasting experience, in terms of the number of years appearing in I/B/E/S, of analysts issuing reports immediately after the conference call; is the percentage of Institutional Investor All-Stars among the analysts issuing prompt reports. Prior research yields mixed results regarding the relation between star status and forecast accuracy (Stickel 1992; Emery and Li 2009) , and between experience and forecast performance (Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999) . Accordingly, we do not have an a priori belief as to how these characteristics may affect the value of either role.
The statistics in Table 3 show that the mean of is 0.071 words per one hundred words in a (or four competition-related words per ), comparable to the sample mean of 0.058 in Li et al. (2013) . The mean value of indicates that 22.2% of our sample conference calls contain earnings that have missed the consensus forecast. The mean value for is 0.836 words per one hundred words in the , which corresponds to an average of around 72 uncertain words in a . As a benchmark, the mean value for reported in Loughran and McDonald (2013) for their sample of S-1 filings is 1.41 words per one hundred words. Our mean value for indicates that, on average, 80.7% of the sentences in our are qualitative. The median number of business segments for our sample firms (# ) is two (the natural log of which is 0.693). The mean forecasting experience of our sample analysts is eight years, and average percentage of stars in them is 22.4%.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The results of estimating Eq.
(2) are reported in Table 5 , Panel A. We find that the coefficients on the interaction terms _ * , _ * and _ * are positive and significant (at least at the 10% level), supporting our prediction that investors place a greater value on the analyst information discovery role when managers have greater incentives to withhold relevant information during conference calls -that is, when firms face higher proprietary cost or litigation risk, or deliver bad news in the earnings conference calls. Moreover, consistent with our prediction that investors put a greater value on the analyst information interpretation role when the processing cost of the disclosure is higher, we find that the coefficients on the interaction terms _ * and _ * are positive and significant (at the 5% level) and that the coefficient on _ * is negative and significant (at the 5% level). That is, the analyst information interpretation role provides more value when managers' statements are more uncertain and qualitative, and less value when managers deliver bad news in the conference call.
The coefficient on the interaction term between _ and # , however, is insignificant, probably because the number of segments is a noisy measure of operations complexity for S&P 500 firms (more than half of sample firms have either one or two segments). The coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between tones and _ are insignificant, suggesting that the impact of earnings performance on analyst value is non-linear and driven by the occurrence of bad news.
We find negative (positive) and significant coefficients on the interaction term between _ ( _ ) and , suggesting that less experienced analysts trigger greater market reaction with discovery, while more experienced analysts trigger greater market reaction with interpretation. This result is consistent with the finding in Soltes (2014) that less experienced analysts have more private interaction with management, which is an important source of analyst discovery. Soltes (2014) argues that less experienced analysts are not as familiar with the economics and institutional features of the industries and firms they cover (consistent with their interpretation being less informative), and thus they compensate for this deficiency in experience by creating opportunities to gain additional information about the firms through private interaction with managers. Consistent with the mixed evidence in the literature, we do not find that investors react to analysts' discovery or interpretation roles differently.
In Panel B of suggest that investors put a greater value on the analyst information interpretation role immediately following earnings conference calls when managers' incentive to withhold information is low, and when processing cost is high. The value of analyst discovery becomes as important as that of analyst interpretation when managers' have strong incentives to withhold information or when the amount of qualitative statements in is very low.
Do analysts respond to investors' information demands?
To further investigate the interplay between the information in analyst research reports and the closely preceding corporate disclosure, we examine the relation between analyst efforts in each information role and the economic determinants identified in the previous section. We measure the effort spent on the information discovery role as the proportion of discussion in analyst research reports devoted to topics that receive little or no mention by managers in the (denoted as ). Because investors value analyst information discovery more when managers are more likely to withhold information, that is, when firms face higher proprietary cost, higher litigation risk, or deliver bad news in the conference call, we predict that increases with these economic determinants.
Because investors value analyst information interpretation more when conference calls contain a greater amount of uncertain and qualitative/subjective language, we posit that in these situations, analysts expend more effort to clarify managers' statements. That is, analysts likely transform management's original statements from the into a more meaningful narrative, which should manifest itself as different word usage from that of managers ( ). To measure this construct, we calculate the average difference between the word vectors of and for the topics that are also discussed in analyst reports (i.e., the average of one minus the cosine similarity between these vectors). 23 As additional control variables, we include the number of analyst questions during the Q&A session (# , measured as the natural log of one plus the number of questions raised by analysts in the Q&A session). Because analysts likely request managers to clarify some statements during the Q&A session, analysts' questions might reduce the need for further clarification in prompt reports. In addition, we control for the magnitude of the earnings news using the absolute value of the earnings surprise ( _ _ ). Finally, we control for the length of the combined prompt analyst reports ( _ ), because Brown and Tucker (2011) find that measures based on cosine similarity are positively correlated with document length.
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in this test are reported in Table 3 . The average level of 0.54 is consistent with the existence of analysts' interpretation using their own language (this variable is bounded within [0, 1]). In our sample, analysts ask 26 questions, on average, during the Q&A session of the call (mean value of # is 3). The mean (median) length of the combined prompt analyst reports ( _ ) is 360 (320) sentences, reflected across an average of nine reports (# ).
[Insert Table 6 here] Table 6 reports the regression results for the cross-sectional determinants of analyst efforts. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are and , respectively. The positive and significant (at least at the 5% level) coefficients on the proprietary cost measure ( ), litigation risk ( ), and bad performance ( ) (reported in column 1) are 23 Word vector of topic k in a document, , , … contains the frequency of all N word in the discussion of topic in the document ( is the total number of unique words in the corpus). Cosine similarity is computed as the dot product of the two vectors normalized by their vector length and captures the textual similarity between two vectors of an inner product space using the cosine angle between them. Two vectors with the same orientation (i.e., two exact same or proportional topic vectors) have a cosine similarity of one; two orthogonal vectors have a similarity of zero. Cosine similarity is widely used in textual analysis research to compare narratives (see the review of Loughran and McDonald 2016) . Internet Appendix II provides two illustrative examples from excerpts of conference calls transcripts and analyst reports, with high and low levels of , respectively. consistent with our prediction that analysts increase their efforts in information discovery when managers have greater incentives to withhold relevant information during conference calls. Column (2) of Table 6 shows that and are positive and significant at the 1% level, which also supports our prediction that analysts increase their interpretation efforts when the conference call is more difficult to process. 24 One interesting finding of note is that in column (2), the results in the regression of yield a significantly negative coefficient for # , suggesting that analysts embark on their information roles during the Q&A session of the earnings conference calls by asking questions; this involvement, in turn, preempts some efforts on the interpretation they exhibit in their prompt reports. It is also consistent with evidence shown by Matsumoto et al. (2011) that the information content of earnings conference calls increases with analyst involvement. Finally, the coefficients on and are insignificant except for the one on in the regression. This is probably because the effort allocation between discovery and interpretation is mostly driven by investors' information demand and less by analyst traits. That is, a star analyst can provide more discovery for one firm but more interpretation for another, depending on the firm's characteristics or the corporate disclosure. 25 Overall, the findings in Table 6 indicate that analysts' efforts spent on information discovery and interpretation reflect their prompt responses to information demands from investors, which ultimately are driven by the characteristics of the firms and managerial disclosures. 24 An alternative explanation of this result is that the processing cost of reflects a difficult-to-understand business environment, and such an environment naturally demands a larger vocabulary to describe, which results in dissimilar language among any information preparers who attempt to describe it. To investigate the validity of this explanation, we conduct a placebo test related to language differences among analysts. In this test, we randomly divided into two groups and re-run the regression by replacing its dependent variable to the language difference between the two groups of analyst reports. The results are reported in Internet Appendix Table IA5 . This table shows that the higher processing costs of do not explain the language differences among analysts, which is inconsistent with the alternative explanation. 25 We repeat the analysis in Table 6 at the individual analyst report level and tabulate the results in Internet Appendix Table IA6 . At the analyst level, we do not find analyst experience and star status to be statistically significant.
Do investors value analysts' efforts?
Having established that investors respond to analysts' information interpretation and discovery and that analysts, in turn, respond to the demands for this information, we next examine the effect of analyst efforts on the value of the different types of discussions in and using the following model:
(3)
Eq.
(3) expands the regression model of Eq. (1) by including the interaction terms between the tone of the discussion and the measures of analysts' efforts (i.e., the proportion of discovery and interpretation in , and 1 , respectively, and the extent of new language used by analysts to interpret the topics, ). If investors value analyst efforts spent on each role, we expect the coefficients on these interaction terms to have positive signs. We also include the interaction term, _ * , to examine whether the manner of analysts' interpretation affects the market reaction to managers' discussion. We do not provide a predicted sign for the interaction term, because the extent of using dissimilar language by analysts can have opposing effects on how the market reacts to managers' disclosures: On the one hand, when analysts use the same or similar language as managers, they provide a confirming value by enhancing management statements' trustworthiness (i.e., the market reacts more to management disclosures when analysts use a more similar language), which suggests a negative predicted sign; on the other hand, analyst new language provides clarification and helps investors understand managers' discussions (i.e., the market reacts more to management disclosures when analysts use a more different language), which suggests a positive predicted sign. Finally, we include the interaction terms * and _ * to examine whether the market reacts to earnings news more intensely because analysts adopt new language to interpret corporate disclosure.
[Insert Table 7 here]
The results of estimating Eq. (3) are reported in Table 7 . We find that value of each role increases with its proportion of the analyst report, as evidenced by the positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficients on _ * and _ * 1 . We also find that the coefficient on _ * 1 * is positive and significant, indicating that investors additionally value analysts' interpretation, given its length when analysts use more of their own language to discuss the topics. The estimated coefficient on _ * is significant and positive, suggesting that, on average, the clarification effect of analysts' interpretation on managerial disclosure dominates its confirming effect. We do not find, however, that market reaction to earnings news intensifies with the level of , probably because analysts use new language to clarify the qualitative information released by managers but not the quantitative signals, such as earnings surprises. Overall, the evidence in Table 7 indicates that investors value analysts' efforts expended on their information discovery and interpretation roles and that the market finds managers' disclosures more informative when analysts spend more efforts to clarify these disclosures.
Does analyst confirmation provide value to investors?
In testing the information "piggyback" hypothesis, existing literature (e.g., Li et al. 2015; Altınkılıç et al. 2013) does not consider the possibility that analysts could provide value to investors even without creating new information. Prior studies (e.g., Miller 2006; Drake et al. 2014) , however, distinguish the media's role of creating new information from its role of disseminating information. In this section, we investigate the possibility that analyst research reports provide value to investors without discovering new information or interpreting corporate disclosure using new languages.
To do so, we design a test that identifies the parts of the discussion in analyst reports that simply provide confirmation to managers' discussions. Empirically, we employ the Pearson's chi-square test for each topic in each -pair to test whether the words used by managers and analysts to discuss a given topic are statistically different. We classify the analyst interpretation of a topic as using similar language when the difference in the distribution of words used to discuss this topic by analysts and managers is not statistically significant. 26 Defined in this way, we find that the interpretation using similar language constitutes 23% of a prompt report, on average, whereas interpretation using new language constitutes 46% (the remaining 31% is in discovery).
We employ the following regression model to investigate whether investors consider all three types of information valuable:
(4)
[Insert Table 8 here]
The results of estimating the above regression are reported in Table 8 . We find positive and significant coefficients for all tone variables, i.e., _ , _ , and _ , consistent with the usefulness of all types of analyst discussions. As one might expect, the magnitude of the positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient on _ is significantly smaller than that of _ and _ (both F-tests significant at the 1% levels). More importantly, the positive and significant coefficient on _ indicates the confirming value provided by analysts.
That is, by selectively repeating topics, analysts attract and direct investors' limited attention to what is important from managers -confirming these topics' usefulness. Moreover, repeating topics likely enhances the reliability of the statements of managers, who may suffer from agency problems, thus confirming these statements ' validity. 27 Importantly, this finding contributes to the debate in the literature on whether analysts are information free because they "piggyback" on recent corporate news (e.g., Li et al. 2015; Bradley et al. 26 That is, if the Pearson's chi-square test fails to reject the homogeneity between and with respect to their word distributions in this topic at the 10% level. 27 Consistent with this intuition, when asked whether analysts sometimes simply confirm what managers say, the All-Star analyst we interviewed replied: "My experience is that sometimes analysts selectively pick up managers' comments to repeat. In many cases it is because he/she believes certain topics are more interesting to the market or have meaningful impact on earnings. In the extreme case of 'parroting', analysts use it to show investors that their thinking is in line with management." 2014; Altınkılıç et al. 2013; Altınkılıç and Hansen 2009 ). These prior studies do not distinguish among different sources of analysts' potential value -their value of creating new information and clarifying corporate disclosures, and their confirming value. Our approach enables us to identify circumstances when analysts repeat corporate disclosure but still provide value to investors.
Conclusion
An overwhelming proportion of analyst reports are issued immediately following important corporate disclosure events. Several papers call into question the value of analysts beyond the closely preceding corporate disclosures and suggest that analysts might be information free and piggyback on corporate disclosures. Despite the vast literature on analysts, we know surprisingly little about how analysts serve the information intermediary roles in this narrow window. We fill the gap in the literature by examining the information content of analyst textual reports, in comparison to information in the preceding corporate disclosure, and whether their efforts, as well as their value, are driven by the characteristics of corporate disclosures.
We use algorithmic analyses of the topics discussed in the textual data of the conference calls and analyst reports to develop novel measures of analysts' information roles. We find that, on average, 31% of an analyst prompt report discusses exclusive topics not referred to in the conference call, which we consider as analysts serving an information discovery role. In the remaining 69% of the discussion in a prompt report, analysts discuss conference call topics, which we consider as the information interpretation role. We show that both discovery and interpretation trigger economically significant market reactions beyond the associated earnings news and conference call discussions, suggesting that analyst information roles provide value. To understand the sources of their value, we show that investors rely on analyst information discovery more when managers have stronger incentives to withhold information during the conference calls and rely on analyst information interpretation more when the processing cost of the conference call information is higher. Analyst effort to discuss new topics and their effort to use their own language to clarify managers' statements suggest they offer prompt responses to investors' information demands. Finally, we show that within the 69% of the discussion in prompt reports where analysts interpret conference call topics, 23% of such discussion does not entail a different vocabulary than that used by managers in the conference call. That is, analysts sometimes "confirm" managers' statements.
Interestingly, we find that investors value such confirmation, albeit to a lesser extent than analyst discovery or interpretation using the analyst's own language. This finding is consistent with analysts providing "confirming" value to the topics' relevance and validity by selectively repeating management statements.
Our study advances the literature by contributing to the understanding of the different information roles that analysts play, as well as the interplay between their information roles and corporate disclosures.
We also make a contribution by explicitly quantifying the thematic content of analyst research reports and contrasting it with managers' discussions during earnings conference calls. Our study provides insight into how to use topic modeling to significantly expand the application of textual analysis to incorporate financial disclosures beyond an understanding of "how texts are being said" to a broader understanding of "what is being said" in these texts.
The next several steps prepare the textual data for the LDA analysis. First, we exclude venue-specific language or time-invariant information that is not associated with any economically relevant topics. For conference calls, we exclude narratives from operators, greeting words used by various speakers, and the safe harbor statements typically read by Investor Relation Officers. For analyst reports, we follow Huang et al. (2014) and remove the tables, graphs, and "brokerage disclosures." Brokerage disclosures contain explanations of the stock-rating system, disclosures regarding conflicts of interest, analyst certifications, disclaimers, glossaries, and descriptions of the brokerage firm. Second, we convert all words into lower case, remove all non-English characters (e.g., punctuation and numbers), and convert all plural nouns into their singular forms. 1 Third, we remove high frequency functional words, also referred to as stop words. There are two benefits from removing stop words. First, these words, such as "a," "of," "the," "this," and "is," are extremely frequent, but convey little economic meaning. Second, stop words contain many deictic words (that is, words that cannot be fully understood without additional contextual information) that constitute the major difference between oral language and written language. 2 Removing them helps mitigate the concern that the difference between conference calls and analyst reports are due to the difference in language style. Fourth, we follow Heylighen and Dewaele (2002) and delete more contextual words that distinguish oral language from written language. Heylighen and Dewaele (2002) develop a much simpler but coarser way to identify contextual words by using grammatical categories, which include pronouns, adverbs, and interjections. Because pronouns and interjections are already excluded as stop words in the third step, in this step, we essentially remove high-frequency adverbs, such as "very," "thus," "really," "actually," and "basically." 3 Moreover, because financial and technical terminology is common in conference calls and analyst reports, we convert high-frequency phrases that constitute specific financial/technical terms into one word (or its common abbreviation if there is one). For example, "target price" is converted into "target-price," "balance sheet" into "balance-sheet," "earnings per share" into "EPS," and "cost of goods sold" into "COGS." This step helps retain financial/technical terms' accurate meanings and disambiguate polysemous words and abbreviations.
Lastly, we remove S&P 500 company names and tickers to prevent LDA from identifying companies as topics.
All of these preprocessing steps enhance the interpretability of the topics identified and reduce the computational burden of the LDA model. After these steps, we have approximately 303 million words in our corpus.
C. Determining the parameters of the LDA algorithm
The LDA algorithm we use is the "Stanford Topic Modeling Toolbox" developed by the Stanford Natural Language Processing Group (Ramage et al. 2009 ). It requires the researcher to set three parameters for the assumed statistical model including the total number of topics in the entire collection of documents, and and , which determines how smooth the topic and word distributions are, respectively (please see Internet Appendix I for a detailed explanation).
The number of topics of the model affects the interpretability of the results. Setting the number too low can result in topics that are too broad and ambiguous. Conversely, setting the number too high may introduce economically meaningless topics. To select the optimal number of topics, we follow the computational linguistic literature and calculate the Perplexity Score of the LDA model based on different numbers of topics (Blei et al., 2003; Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004 ). The perplexity score measures the ability of an LDA model estimated on a subset of documents (training data) to predict the word choices in the remaining documents (testing data). It is defined as the exponential of the negative normalized predictive likelihood under the model. Accordingly, the perplexity score is monotonically decreasing in the likelihood of observing the testing data, given the model estimated from the training data. A lower perplexity score indicates that the model has better generalization performance. Formally, for a testing data ( ) with M documents, the perplexity score is equal to:
where is the number of words in document ; is a vector of all the words in document ; and is the probability of observing the word vector in document given the LDA model estimated from the training data.
Following the literature (Blei et al., 2003; Rosen-Zvi et al., 2004) , we compute and plot the perplexity scores of the LDA model for different numbers of topics, ranging from 2 to 120. As Appendix Figure 1 shows, the perplexity score improves with the number of topics, but the improvement is marginally decreasing. The improvement diminishes significantly once the number of topics exceeds 60. Therefore, we choose 60 as the number of topics in our corpus. 4
Appendix Figure 1 . Perplexity of LDA model for different numbers of topics
The choice of the values of and depends on the specific textual genre, the number of topics and the vocabulary size. We choose values of 0.1 and 0.01 for and , respectively, based on the recommended values in the literature (Steyvers and Griffiths 2006; Kaplan and Vakili 2015) .
D. Constructing a topic vector of a document
The output from the LDA algorithm is a topic-word probability matrix in which an element, , is word 's probability in topic . With the LDA output, we construct the topic vector ( ) of a document using the following procedures: First, for each sentence in , we sum the probabilities of its words in each topic to obtain this sentence's probabilities in all topics. Next, we assign each sentence to the topic in which it has the highest probability. 5 Lastly, we calculate the fraction of document that is dedicated to topic ( ) as document d's proportion of sentences assigned to topic . Formally, the topic vector of document d is defined as , , 4 The suitable number of topics depends on the specific samples employed by different studies. For example, Ball et al. (2013) use 100 topics for MD&A text; Quinn et al. (2010) use 42 topics for political text; Atkins et al. (2012) use 100 topics for couples-therapy transcripts. In addition to using the perplexity score, we also compare LDA outputs manually based on 30, 60, and 100 topics. Based on our comparison, we conclude that the LDA results with 60 topics outperform other specifications in terms of its ability to identify economically important topics without generating too many uninterpretable topics. 5 In a sensitivity test, we assign each sentence to three topics with the highest probabilities. Our empirical results remain qualitatively similar. Perplexity Score
Number of Topics
Appendix II
Variable Definitions Variable Name
Definition The number of sentences labeled by LDA as non-topics in scaled by the total number of sentences in . topics are the topics in which the discussion length exceeds 2% of the .
The average of one minus within-topic cosine word similarity between and in the topics. The within-topic cosine word similarity between and for a given topic is calculated as
word 's frequency in the discussion of topic in ; is word 's frequency in the discussion of topic in ; is the total number of unique words in and . topics are the topics in which the discussion length exceeds 2% of the .
and _ are the textual opinions of the sentences labeled by LDA as non-and topics in , respectively. _ ( _ ) is the textual opinion of the sentences labeled by LDA as topics in using new (similar) language. A topic is defined as using new language if the Pearson's chi-square test for the homogeneity between and with respect to their word distributions in this topic is significant at the 10% level. The textual opinion of the sentences is calculated as the percentage of positive sentences minus the percentage of negative sentences as classified by the naïve Bayes approach (Huang et al. 2014 ).
0,1
The cumulative abnormal return over the [0, 1] window relative to the conference call date, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, where the abnormal return is calculated as the raw return minus the buy-and-hold return on the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted market index.
_
The textual opinion of the sentences labeled by LDA as topics in minus that of the same firm's previous . The textual opinion of the sentences is calculated as the percentage of positive sentences minus the percentage of negative sentences as classified by the naïve Bayes approach (Huang et al. 2014) .
Earnings surprise, calculated as the actual EPS minus the last consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement date, both from I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock price 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.
An indicator variable that equals one if the actual EPS is less than the last consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement date, both from I/B/E/S, and zero otherwise.
The cumulative 10-day abnormal returns ending two days before the conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, where abnormal return is calculated as the raw return minus the buy-and-hold return on the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted market index.
The natural log of the market value of equity of the firm (CSHOQ×PRCCQ) at the end of the quarter prior to the conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.
The book value of equity (CEQ) scaled by the market value of equity (CSHOQ×PRCCQ) of the firm at the end of the quarter prior to the conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.
#
The number of analyst reports issued on the day of or the day following the conference call.
The natural log of one plus the number of questions raised by analysts in the conference call's Q&A session.
Percentage of competition-related words in in the firm's previous conference call. Following Li et al. (2013) , competition related words include "competition," "competitor," "competitive," "compete," and "competing." We include words with an "s" appended and do not count words in phrases that contain negation, such as "less competitive," and "few competitors."
The standard deviation of the monthly return of the firm in the 12 months prior to the conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%.
The average experience of analysts who issue reports on the day of or the day following the conference call. Experience is measured as the number of years since the analyst first issued a forecast in I/B/E/S. The number of analysts who are ranked as Institutional Investor All-Star analysts, scaled by the total number of analysts who issued reports on the day of or the day following the conference call.
The number of words in that are in the Uncertainty word list created by Loughran and McDonald (2013) , scaled by the total number of words in .
One minus the percentage of sentences that contain "$" or "%."
The natural log of a firm's number of segments.
_ _
The absolute value of the earnings surprise, calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the actual EPS and the last consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement date, both from I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock price 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date, winsorized at the top 2%.
_
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This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (1). All variables are defined in Appendix II. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.
Dependent Variable 0,1 _ 0.041*** (10.9) _ 0.061*** (16.7) _ 0.039*** (7.9) _ 2.828*** (10.6) -0.013*** (-8.9) _ * -2.503*** (-7.8) _ -0.060*** (-4.8) -0.000 (-0.5) 0.016*** (8.3) # -0.000*** (-3.6) -0.021*** (-3.9)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Observations 16,923 Adjusted R 2 0.138 Table 5 Determinants and Relative Value of Analyst Information Discovery and Information Interpretation
Panel A: Determinants of the value of analyst information discovery and interpretation roles
This panel reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (2). All variables are defined in Appendix II. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses on the right of the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 0.038*** (7.7) -0.000 (-1.6) -0.001*** (-4.2) 0.001** (2.1) -0.000 (-0.9) # -0.000 (-0.3) -0.013*** (-6.3) _ 2.893*** (8.0) _ * -2.619*** (-6.4) 0.000 (1.3) 0.000
Dependent
(1.2) _ -0.063*** (-5.0) -0.000 (-0.1) 0.017*** (8.9) # -0.000*** (-4.0) -0.021*** (-3.1)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Observations 16,615 Adjusted R 2 0.146
Panel B: The relative value of information discovery and information interpretation
This panel reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of the main variables from estimating Eq. (1). In Columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) and (6), and (7) and (8), we separately estimate Eq. (1) for sub-samples of conference calls in the bottom and top deciles in terms of , ,
, and , respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix II. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
Determinants of Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Roles
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from OLS regressions of and on their determinants and control variables. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix II. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests.
Dependent Variables
(1)
(2) 0.027** (2.4) 0.096*** (4.0) 0.021*** (4.1) 0.001*** (7.7) # 0.000 (0.2) 0.005*** 0.000 (3.2) (0.0) _ _ -0.103 0.165 (-0.4) (0.6) -0.002* -0.002 (-1.9) (-0.2) 0.005 0.010 (0.8) (0.6) # 0.001 -0.009*** (0.6) (-3.4) 0.005*** -0.000 (3.3) (-0.3) -0.004 -0.001 (-0.8) (-0.4) _ -0.000 -0.000*** (-0.6) (-17 
Investors' Value of Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Efforts
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (3). All variables are defined in Appendix II. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses to the right of the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. Year Fixed Effect Yes Observations 16,923 Adjusted R 2 0.135 Table 8 Investors' Reaction to Analyst Information Discovery, New Language, and Confirmation
Dependent
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (4). All variables are defined in Appendix II. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. Year Fixed Effect Yes Observations 16,627 Adjusted R 2 0.130

